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Article 11

RECENT CASE NOTES
INSANE

PERSONS-MORTGAGES-EQUITY-SUBROGATION. -

The conserva-

tor in insanity for Plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, was authorized by an
Illinois court to negotiate bonds and mortgages for $3,600.00 on plaintiff's
Indiana realty, to satisfy mortgage debts of $3,300.00 on the property
which the mortgagors refused to renew at maturity. Defendant, in good
faith, and relying entirely upon the authorization of the Illinois court
made the loan and accepted the mortgages which were not authorized or
approved by the Indiana court of competent jurisdiction. Plaintiff, when
subsequently pronounced sane, refused to ratify the act of his conservator
and sued to quiet his title to the real estate against defendant's mortgages.
Defendant answered by filing a cross complaint. Plaintiff appeals from
a judgment foreclosing defendant's mortgages as equitable heirs upon the
property. Held: Judgment reversed with directions that defendants be
subrogated to the rights of the mortgages whose claims he paid. Shaw
-v. Meyer-Kiser Bank, Supreme Court of Indiana, May 18, 1927, 150 N. E.
552.
The validity of the mortgage of real estate is to be determined by
the law of the place where the property is situated. Swank v. Hufnagle,
111 Ind. 453. In Indiana, the mortgaging of the realty of an insane person
is governed by statute. Burns' Ann. St. sec. 3431-3435. Where the only
power to incumber the real estate is derived from the statutes, an attempt
to mortgage by one not duly authorized is a nullity. Mattox v. Hightshaw,
39 Ind. 95. When the legal invalidity of the instrument is caused by lack
of power to execute the conveyance, equity will not give it effect as an
equitable mortgage lien. Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504; Baxter v. Bodkin,
25 Ind. 172. In case the debt for which the void mortgage is given to
secure, is valid, the court of equity having jurisdiction of a suit to quiet
title will not quiet title against such invalid mortgage, which is an apparent cloud on title, unless the party "invoking the aid of equity show that he
has done equity to him of whom he complains." Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind.
504; Russell v. Drake, 184 Ind. 623. When an obligation is discharged
by one not primarily liable for it, at the request of the party ultimately
bound, equity will protect the party making the payments but he is only
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditors whose claims he
has paid. Pomeroy's Treatise on Equitable Remedies, sec. 920; Jolliffe v.
Crawford, 76 Ind. App. 282; Fisher v. Bush, 133 Ind. 315; Warford v.
Hawkins, 150 Ind. 489.
M. R. H.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE-MALICE-Action by appellee

to recover damages for alleged malicious prosecution. Appellee employed
by appellant to sell and deliver gasoline and oil. Appellee worked under
superintendent whose duty it was to check daily reports of appellee to see
if they were correct and if appellee had made correct statement of sales.
Superintendent found shortage and reported same to appellee's sureties
and also laid the matter before prosecuting attorney with explanation that
he was acting for surety company. Prosecuting attorney refused to act
until matter was put before grand jury. Appellee indicted and arrested.
No evidence of malice. Succeeding prosecutor filed motion, without investigation, to dismiss indictment and court did so. Appellant's motion to
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make complaint more specific and demurrer overruled. Appellant appeals.
Held: Demurrer and motion properly overruled, but there was a lack of
evidence to warrant recovery. Reversed for appellant. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Glendenning, Appellate Court of Indiana, April 22, 1927, 156
N. E. 182.
In an action for malicious prosecution, the complaint must allege want
of probable cause, malice, and that proceedings complained of ended in
favor of appellee. Casey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375; Gorrell v. Snow, 31 Ind.
215; Steel v. Williams, 18 Ind. 161; Seiger v. Pfeifer, 3& Ind. 13; Ruston v.
Bidd:e, 43 Ind. 515; McCullough v. Rice, 59 Ind. 580; Sasse v. Rogers, 40
Ind. App. 197. Record showing acquittal is not admissible to show want of
probable cause, but is admissible only for purpose of showing termination
in appellee's favor. Such records need not be attached to complaint as
exhibits. 38 C. J. sec. 143; Ammerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451. Filing of
original proceeding does not make such copy a part of complaint. Fisher
v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341. Evidence of unusual delay in beginning action,
or delay in bringing to trial, and final dismissal without a trial may be
considered by jury as tending to sustain the action. York v. Webster, 66
Ind. 50. Where prosecutor acts on independent investigation, of his own,
instead of on the statement of facts by party making complaint, the latter
has not caused the prosecution and cannot be held for malicious prosecution. Such is the case where party making complaint acts only in subordination to prosecutor and under his direction or where he states the facts
to prosecutor leaving him to judge of the propriety of proceeding with the
charge, and where the latter acts on his own initiative in so doing, 38 C. J.
sec. 25. A private corporation is liable for a malicious prosecution instituted by its agent, where such was authorized, or ratified, or was within
scope of agent's authority. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 167 Ind.
544.
A. L. B.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CAsuAL EMPLOYMENT.-Appellant filed an application for compensation vs. appellee
for an injury received while repairing one of appellee's school buildings.
The evidence shows that appellant was conducting an independent personal business as plumber, tinner, and contractor; that appellee engaged
appellant to repair the roof of one of its school buildings; that there was
no contract fixing the price of such repair work; that while appellant was
engaged in the repairing of said roof he received a personal injury as the
result of a ladder slipping from under him; that his helpers who were
aiding him in making the repairs completed the work after his injury; and
that appellant charged and received from the appellee $1.25 per hour for
the labor performed. From a judgment denying compensation for the disability resulting from the injury, claimant appeals. He!d: The employment was casual and appellant is not entitled to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hays v. Board of Trustees of Clinton School
City. Appellate Court of Indiana, Oct. 6, 1927; 158 N. E. 234.
The one question presented by the appeal, is, was the employment of
appellant at the time of his injury both casual and not in the usual course
of the business, trade, occupation, or profession of the employer, within
the meaning of clause (b) of sec. 76 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
sec. 9521, Burns' 1926. The above statute excludes from its benefits any
person whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of
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the business of his employer. Was the employment in the present case
casual? In general, the cases hold that one engaged incidentally and occasionally, for a limited purpose, is a casual employee. In In Re Gaynor, 217
Mass. 86, it was said, "The word casual is in common use. Its ordinary
signification, as shown by the lexicographers, is something which comes
without regularity and is occasional and incidental. Its meaning may be
more clearly understood by referring to its antonymn, which are regular,
systematic, periodic, and certain." That the employment of appellant in
the present case was casual is clearly evident. Bai~ey v. Humrickhouse,
83 Ind. App. 497, Zeidler et al -v. Prucher (Indiana), 154 N. E. 35; Smith
v. Philadelphia& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 563; Blood v.
Industrial Acc. Commission of State of Cal., 157 P. 1140. Was the employment of the appellant within the usual course of the business of the
employer. This phrase is held to cover the normal and usual operations
which form part of the ordinary business carried on, and not to include
incidental and occasional operations having for their purpose the preservations of the premises or the appliances used in the business. There is
no evidence in the principal case that appellee was engaged in any business
which in its usual course called for the employment of a house roofer.
Zeidler et al. v. Prucher (Indiana), 154 N. E. 35; Holbrook v. Olympia
Hotel Co. et al, 166 N. W. 876; Oliphant v. Hawkinson, 183 N. W. 805;
Callihan v. Montgomery, 115 A. 889; London & Lancashire Guarantee &
Accident Co. of Canada v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cal. et al,
161 P. 2.
H. C. L.
PARTY WALLS-INDEDINITY-COVENANTS

RUNNING WITH THE LAND.-

In 1910 Michael Clune and Mary Adler agreed for extension of a party
wall, Clune to construct the extension and to repair Mary Adler's buildings which must be partially removed, and Mary Adler to pay Clune $75.00
therefor. Also that whenever Mary Adler, her heirs or assigns used the
whole or any part of the extension she would pay Clune or those holding
under him one-half the value of the extension at the time of such use,
and that the covenants in the contract should run with the land. McClune
Realty and Investment Company succeeded to ownership of land and rights
in the party wall of Clune. Adler tract was leased to Leo and Louis Traugott in 1916 by ninety-nine year lease, and in 1917 conveyed to Wineman.
Realty Company subject to the ninety-nine year lease. In 1922 Traugotts' was assigned to Fair Building Company. The lease to Traugotts
contained provision that lessees would save lessor harmless from damage
done to adjoining property owner by reason of erection of contemplated
improvements, and if further improvements should be made, lessee should
execute a bond of indemnity. In 1922 Fair Building Company as principal
and Traugotts as surety executed to Wineman Realty Company a bond
indemnifying them from liability for injury to adjoining property, and
erected a business block on Adler land, attaching same to party wall, part
of which was extension constructed by Clune in 1910. Clune Company
brings this action vs. Fair Realty Company, Traugotts as lessees, and
Wineman Company, as owner, to recover one-half of the value of the party
wall. Defendant Wineman Company filed a cross-complaint against its
co-defendant Fair Building Company and two Traugotts on the indemnity
bond. Judgment for plaintiff Co. v. Defendant Wineman Co. for $3,135.00.
Also judgment for Wineman Co. on cross-complaint vs. Fair Building Co.
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and Traugotts for $3,135.00. Defendants appeal. Held: Affirmed. The
right to receive pay for the party wall as well as covenant to pay therefor
ran with the land, and lessees agreeing to save lessor harmless from damage in erection of building held for one-half of value of party wall used
by them. FairBuilding Co. et al. vs. Wineman Realty Co. et al., Appellate
Court of Indiana, April 26, 1927. 156 N. E. 433.
In considering whether a covenant is one which does or does not run
with the land, there is always embraced the following inquiries: 1. Is the
covenant one which, under any circumstances, may run with the land?
2. Was it the intention of the parties, as expressed in the agreement, that
it should so run? Conduit v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166. The general rule is that
a covenant which may run with the land must have relation to the interest
or estate granted, and the act to be done must concern the interest conveyed or created. Conduit v. Ross, supra. In the present case, by contract
Clune acquired the right to extend a party wall on Mary Adler's property.
This was a grant to him of an interest in land, and was of such a character that a perpetual covenant might be annexed to it. Snowden v. Wilas,
19 Ind. 10, Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. In consideration for this grant
Clune covenanted to do an act beneficial to the land of Mary Adler, that of
erecting the wall. Also he covenanted that when he should receive onehalf of the cost of the wall, that Mary Adler, her heirs or assigns should
become owner of one-half of the party wall. This agreement created what
have been aptly termed cross-easements in favor of each in the land of
the other. It contained therefor all the elements necessary to a covenant
capable of running with the land. Hazlett v. Sinclair, supra. In many
jurisdictions, and in Indiana, there has been a distinction made between
the running of a covenant for the benefit and burden of lands. Many cases
hold that a covenant for benefit of land is personal to the builder of the
party wall, but when the burden touches and concerns the land the covenant runs with it. But this question is not raised in this case, as both
covenants for benefit and burden are capable of running with the land if
such intent is expressed in the contract. An indication of the parties of
their intention to bind subsequent holders of the property is necessary to
the running of the agreement. Otherwise it will be deemed personal. Conduit v. Ross, supra. But failure to state that the covenant is to run with
the land is immaterial when the intention of the parties can be gathered
from the mention of assigns. 66 L. R. A. 678 note. In the present case
that intent is clearly expressed by the use "heirs and assigns" in the case
of the covenant of Mary Adler, and "or those holding under him" in the
case of Clune. Also there is an express provision that the covenants shall
run with the land. The case of Millikan v. Hunter, 180 Ind. 153, is a definite decision that when an instrument conveys or grants an interest or
right in land and also contains a covenant so expressed as to show that it
was reasonably the intent that it should be continuing, it shall be construed
as a covenant running with the land.
No weight can be given to appellants' contention that they were without
notice of the covenant. The party wall agreement was duly recorded a
short time after its execution. The universal rule is that the proper registration of a party wall agreement is notice to all purchasers of the real
estate affected by the agreement. 66 L. R. A. 678 note.
It is clear from the lease and indemnity bond that Wineman Company
was not to be liable for any damage done by the Fair Building Company in
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erecting a building on the leased property, but that lessees would hold the
owner harmless. The court properly rendered judgment vs. Fair Company
and Traugotts in favor of Wineman Company.
A. V. R.
RAPE--EVIDENCE--UNCORRo0ORATED TESTIMONY OF PROSEcuTix.--Appel-

lant was charged by affidavit for the crime of rape on one, E. B., a woman
of 16 years. He had twice been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in a
penal institution for felonies. The prosecutrix testified that the prisoner
entered her room at about a quarter of four one morning through the front
window. She first saw him standing by the side of the window. Next
he was walking on his hands and knees and shining his flash light. Thinking it was her father, she said, "Is that you, Daddy?" Whereupon appellant said, "Shut up, or I will kill you," and came over and laid a knife on
her neck and a gun on her breast. She submitted because of fear and
stated the prisoner had intercourse with her against her will. She stated
that slhe never had intercourse before. She had never seen the man before
until she identified him on the streets. She was positive that this was the
man in her room who forced her against her will and then left. It was
about 4 A. M. when he left and when prosecutrix went to the room occupied by her parents telling them what had happened. The prisoner entered a plea of not guilty, denying that he committed the crime, and attempting to prove an alibi by his relatives and a boarder at his mother's
home. He was adjudged guilty. Held: Judgment affirmed. Abshtre v.
State, 158 N. E. 227, Supreme Court of Indiana, Oct. 6, 1927.
The prisoner pleaded not guilty and so the problem of consent in confession and avoidance was not involved. Even if he pleaded consent, the
case would have gone against him as the rule is that if there is evidence
of sexual intercourse and the display of weapons or other incriminating
evidence, the prosecutrix testifying she yielded through fear and on account of threats, it is sufficient to warrant conviction. Hutchins v. State,
140 Ind. 78. This case, however, involves two other questions. First,
whether uncorroborated testimony of complaining witness, if sufficient to
convince jury or court, may support conviction for rape. Second, whether
her testimony identifying defendant was sufficient to support conviction.
The second question could be easily disposed-evidence held sufficient to
support conviction for rape, under Acts 1921, c. 148, sec. 1 (Burns' Ann.
St. 1926, see. 2429), where complaining witness identified defendant.
The first question is neither provided for nor required by statute in this
state. This is the first case on this point as no Indiana case could be found
touching it. However, there are many authorities from other jurisdictions
supporting this case. Unless required by statute (N. Y. Pen. Code, see.
283), it is the weight of authority that the unsupported testimony of the
prosecutrix, if believed by the jury, or if sufficient to convince jury or
court, is sufficient to convict of rape. More than twenty states in this
country have cases decided in support of this rule. Crocker v. People, 213
Ill. 287; People v. Bates, 70 Mich. 234; People v. Benc, 130 Cal. 159; State
v. Latten, 29 Conn. 389; Wallace v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 548. But prisoner
should not be convicted without corroboration where the testimony of the
prosecutrix bears on its face indications of unreliability or improbability,
and particularly when it is contradicted by other evidence. People v,. Ardagor, 51 Cal. 371; People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, on reversing the lower
court said, "the evidence is so improbable of itself as to warrant us in the
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belief that the verdict was more the result of prejudice or popular excitement, than the calm and dispassionate conclusion upon the facts by 12 men
sworn to discharge this duty faithfully." However, the mere fact that
prisoner testifies in his own behalf and positively denies his guilt does not,
by the weight of authority, render corroboration necessary. John v. People, 197 Ill. 48, People v. Randall, 133 Mich. 516.
P A. L.
STATUTES-CoNSTRUCTION-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-Mandamus

to

compel

D, state auditor, to draw a warrant to pay P for his services as state
senator. By act of April 21, 1881, the legislature fixed the pay of members
of the legislature at $6.00 per day. An act passed in 1925 provided that
"from and after the first day of January, 1928," the pay should be $10.00
per day. This act made no allusion to the pay to be received by the members of the 1926-27 assembly. The 1926-27 assembly passed an emergency
act fixing the pay for members of the 1926-27 assembly at $10.00 per day.
By the Indiana Constitution "* * * no increase of compensation shall
take effect during the session at which such increase shall be made." Article 4, Sec. 29. D claims the act of 1925 is still in force and the act of
1926-27 unconstitutional. Held. Judgment for D below reversed. The
1925 act took-effect at once, revoking the act of 1881. Thus the act of 1927
was constitutional, it not being an increase, since no provision for payment
was in force to be increased. Willoughby and Meyrs, J. J., dissenting. State
ex rel. Me3dl v. Bowman, Supreme Court of Indiana, April 19, 1927, 156
N. E. 399.
The presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. 6 R.
C. L. 97. Where "statutes are capable of a construction that will make
them constitutional, they will be so construed, and their validity upheld,
on the theory that the legislature intendsd to enact a constitutional law."
Thorlton v. Guirl D. Co., 184 Ind. 637, Crittenbergerv. State, etc., Trust
Co., 189 Ind. 411; Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556. Even
though the construction adopted does not appear to be as natural as the
other. 6 R. C. L. 78, State v. Wo!len, 128 Tenn. 456. Grave doubts of its
unconstitutionality are insufficient to overthrow it. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210; Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110. Its unconstitutionality must be clear and palpable. State v. Martin, Ind., 139 N.
E. 282; Carr v. State, 157 Ind. 241, State v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579. And to
doubt is to sustain the validity of a statute. Wilson v. Fargo, N. D., 186
N. W 263. But where a statute clearly transgresses the authority vested
in the legislature, the court must declare it unconstitutional. 6 R. C. L. 72.
A repeal does not take effect until the new statute goes into effect and becomes operative. So where an act does not go into operation until a future
date, former statutes, repealed thereby, do not become repealed until such
future date. 25 R. C. L. 932; State v. Edwards, 136 Mo. 360; McArthur v.
Franklin, 16 Ohio St. 193, 36 Cyc. 1081. Such a statute speaks from the
date it becomes effective, and not from the date of its enactment. Price v.
Hopkins, 13 Mich. 318, State ex rel Beun3es v. Brockelman, Mo., 24 S. W.
209; PattersonFoundry & Mach. Co. v. Ohio River Power Co., 99 Ohio St.
429. However, an act will take effect from the date of filing in all the
counties, although some provisions of the act may, by the terms thereof,
not be fully operative until a later period. State v. Indiana Board, 155
Ind. 414; Sudbury v. Board, 157 Ind. 446. The case turns on the intent of
the legislature in passing the 1925 act. It can scarcely be said the intent
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to make that act effective only in 1929 is clear beyond all doubt. Thus
since to doubt is to sustain, and the rule is to find an act constitutional if
at all possible, though the construction adopted does not appear to be as
natural as the other, the majority opinion seems right in holding the 1927
act constitutional, the act of 1881 being revoked in 1925 by the act of that
date.
B. B. C.

